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INTRODUCTION'
Despite the "government-to-government" 2 rhetoric of the United
States when describing its relationship to American Indian nations,3 eco-
nomic self-sufficiency has paradoxically eroded Indian nations' status as
sovereign governments. In a number of areas, but in employment particu-
larly, the U.S.-Indian relationship has reverted to past stereotypes, paternal-
ism, and assimilationism.4 Two views influence this regression: that "com-
mercial," or "non-traditional," tribal economic development activities have
"little to do with tribal self-government;"5 and that Indian nations' commer-
1. This Essay derives from my participation on the panel "Labor and Employment
Laws in Indian Country," sponsored by the Section on Indian Nations and Indigenous Peo-
ples at the Association of American Law Schools 2008 Annual Meeting. The other panelists,
Kaighn Smith, Jr., Wenona T. Singel, and Bryan H. Wildenthal, have all contributed greatly
to the scholarly dialogue engendered by the recent National Labor Relations Board and D.C.
Circuit decisions applying the National Labor Relations Act to the tribal casino operations of
the San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians and others. Mr. Smith, a longtime practi-
tioner of federal Indian law, participated on the amici brief of the Indian Tribes and Tribal
Organizations before the D.C. Circuit. Professor Singel published a criticism of the Board
decision shortly after its release. See Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-
Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 691 (2004). Professor Wildenthal recently published a meticu-
lous and comprehensive analysis exposing the faulty reasoning in both decisions, as well as
that of the underlying authority used in each. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law,
Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REv. 413 (2007). The pur-
pose of this Article is not to re-examine the legal analyses of the decisions but to highlight
the difficulties they present for Indian nations in the management of their employment rela-
tions. I refer the reader to Professor Wildenthal's analysis throughout.
2. All three branches of the U.S. Government have used this term to describe U.S.-
Indian relations. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000); Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa-3, 458aaa-4 (2000);
Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act, 25 U.S.C. §
4301 (2000); Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Memorandum
on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59
Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Tribal Justice, FAQs about
Native Americans, http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/nafaqs.htm#otj26 (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
3. The terms "Indian nations" and "Indian tribes" shall be used interchangeably.
Both denote American Indian groups' status as distinct political entities.
4. Kaighn Smith observed in his presentation that "we are in a new assimilationist
era," and pointed out that courts are forcing Indian nations to assimilate their economies.
Kaighn Smith, Jr., Remarks at Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan.
5, 2008) (author's notes). See also Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction
over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1047, 1124-25 (2005); Angela
R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REv. 799, 846-48 (2007); Wil-
denthal, supra note 1, at 529.
5. Berger, supra note 4, at 1050. Although Professor Berger writes in the context
of Indian nations' treatment of nonmembers in trial courts, the same issues arise with respect
to tribal employment of nonmembers.
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cial interactions with non-tribal members, usually non-Indians, in the course
of tribal economic development activities require federal oversight. Thus,
when non-Indians happen to be employed in "commercial" tribal activities
that fund and support Indian nations' political, social, cultural, and eco-
nomic infrastructures-their very nationhood-Indian nations are deemed
not to be acting as governments, but rather as private actors. A third con-
tributing view is that prosperous Indians cannot be "real" Indians as they do
not comport with the non-Indian population's stereotypical images and be-
liefs about Indians,6 implicitly justifying their treatment as private actors
rather than sovereign governments. These views are illustrated by the trend
beginning in the 1980s toward applying federal labor and employment laws
to the economic development activities of Indian nations, which ironically
coincides with tribal economic initiatives toward self-sufficiency and self-
determination pursuant to federal laws such as the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEA)7 and the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act (IGRA).8
The latest development in this trend is the assumption of jurisdiction
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "Board") over union or-
ganizing activities at tribal workplaces, particularly casinos,9 and challenges
to tribal labor laws. Last year in San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v.
NLRB, the D.C. Circuit upheld an NLRB order applying the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) ° to the San Manuel Band's casino operation." Al-
though the court affirmed the Board's determination that Indian nations are
covered employers under the NLRA and the resulting assertion of jurisdic-
tion over the casino workplace, the court's holding focused on the Board's
assertion of jurisdiction over the casino operation. 2 It did not comment on
6. See Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism: Reactions to
Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgment, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
313, 328 (2006).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000).
8. Id. §§ 2701-2721.
9. For example, the NLRB recently directed elections in Foxwoods Resort Casino,
Case No. 34-RC-2230 (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/
Regional%20Decisions/2007/34-RC-2230%2010-24-07.pdf; and Soaring Eagle Casino and
Resort, Case No. GR-7-RC-23147 (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.nlrb.gov/shared files/
regional%20Decisions/2007/7-RC-23147%2011-20-07.pdf. See Wildenthal, supra note 1, at
423-31, for a brief history of the San Manuel tribe and its casino.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187. The NLRA governs labor-management relations and
collective bargaining in the private sector and protects the right of employees to engage in
concerted activity for "mutual aid or protection." Id. § 151. The latter protection extends to
non-unionized employees as well as those who are represented.
11. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB., 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
The Board decision had departed from thirty-year-old precedent under which it had treated
Indian nations as governmental entities.
12. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055 (2004).
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the more far-reaching aspect of the Board's decision, which is how and
when the Board will decide to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over
any tribal employment activity. Essentially the Board bifurcated tribal em-
ployment into two categories-"commercial" and "traditionally tribal or
governmental"--for the purpose of determining whether the NLRA would
govern the relationship, without defining the contours of either category. 3
As a result, these categories will be defined by federal courts or administra-
tive bodies such as the NLRB.
This Essay will explore the detrimental effects of federal regulation on
tribal employment. Unlike private sector employers, Indian nations rely on
revenue from their business activities to fund their governments and gov-
ernment services, because unlike federal, state, and local governments, In-
dian nations cannot rely on tax revenue for such funding. 4 Application of
federal labor and employment laws such as the NLRA to Indian nations'
business activities diminishes their sovereignty by substantially interfering
with their ability to manage and control their economic development. If
they become subject to federal regulation, Indian nations' regulatory and
adjudicatory authority over employment relationships will be significantly
curtailed. Not only will they be subject to federal laws in addition to their
own laws governing employment, some federal laws may preempt tribal
laws or preclude traditional remedies. Most employment disputes will be
resolved in federal, rather than tribal, courts and may be subject to a wide
range of federal statutory remedies.
As the San Manuel Board decision demonstrates, not all tribal em-
ployment activities may be subject to federal laws, so Indian nations must
proceed with uncertainty, as courts have not clearly articulated conditions
that will trigger federal regulation; 5 different managerial schemes and poli-
cies may be needed for different types of employment, but it would not be
clear where the differences lie. Threshold issues of coverage would there-
fore be decided by courts or agencies. In addition, tribal treasuries will be
subject to additional recordkeeping and administrative costs, legal fees, and
damage awards. Employment and training opportunities for citizens, such
as those provided by tribal employment rights ordinances, may be curtailed
or bargained away. Wide-ranging federal regulation is not conducive to a
climate of economic development and self-sufficiency for the vast majority
of Indian nations that do not benefit from lucrative casinos for their liveli-
hoods. 6
13. Id. at 1062.
14. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Develop-
ment as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REv. 759 (2004).
15. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1063.
16. In 2006, eighty-four percent of all Indian gaming revenue came from twenty-
eight percent of the total number of gaming operations (a number of Indian nations own
470 [Vol. 2008:467
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I. REGULATION OF TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER MONTANA
The U.S. Supreme Court has long acknowledged Indian nations' in-
herent regulatory and adjudicatory authority over matters pertaining to tribal
economic activity and commercial relations, even when non-Indians are
involved. It cited two examples of this authority in Montana v. United
States:
7
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil juris-
diction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or wel-
fare of the tribe."8
Employment is a consensual contractual relationship. 9 Most Indian
nations cannot staff their workforces solely with tribal members, so non-
members, including non-Indians, will certainly be parties to most tribal em-
ployment relationships. Persons who enter into an employment relationship
with an Indian nation have voluntarily placed themselves under that nation's
authority to regulate the relationship, just like a citizen of one state who
takes a job working for another state. Under Montana, an Indian nation
may regulate its employment activities as it deems appropriate for its politi-
cal, economic, cultural, and social welfare. Likewise, the Indian nation may
adjudicate employment and other disputes arising through the consensual
employment relationship in a manner that promotes and preserves the eco-
nomic security and the welfare of its nation and citizens. Fundamentally,
rights and obligations arising from the employment relationship, including
defense of lawsuits or other types of disputes, directly affect the economic
security and welfare of the nation. Like any sovereign, Indian nations must
be able to control the circumstances under which they may be liable, as well
as the extent of their liability. These points were recognized by Board
Member Peter Schaumber, who dissented from the Board's decision in San
Manuel:
multiple gaming operations). NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, NIGC ANNOUNCES 2006
INDIAN GAMING REVENUES, PR-63-07-2007 (June 4, 2007), available at http://www.nigc.gov/
ReadingRoom/PressReleases/iPR63062007/PR63072007/tabid/784/Default.aspx.
17. 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that Crow Tribe did not have regulatory jurisdic-
tion over hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation fee land).
18. Id. at 565-66 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
19. MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1072-73 (10th Cir. 2007).
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The fact that a tribe may, as here, employ some nonmembers in the conduct of its
business no more negates the scope of its sovereignty than the fact that a State
government employs nonresidents. Tribes cannot reasonably be expected to look
only to their members for all of the skills and expertise necessary to carry out their
activities. A tribe's ability to establish and control the terms and conditions of em-
ployment for its member and nonmember employees is an essential aspect of self-
government that clearly "has some direct effect on the political integrity, the eco-
nomic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe."2°
Within the federal courts, only the Tenth Circuit recognizes that regu-
lation of economic activity, including employment activity, is an attribute of
sovereignty. It utilizes this correct premise for the analysis of whether fed-
eral labor and employment laws apply to the tribal workforce: that Indian
nations, as governments, engage in economic activity, including employ-
ment activity, and regulate that activity in order to fund their governments
and ensure their national welfare and self-sufficiency, as well as that of their
citizens. In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 2 in which the court upheld a tri-
bal right-to-work law,22 it stated that "tribes retain sovereign authority to
regulate economic activity within their own territory."'23 Recently, the Tenth
Circuit again applied the premise that regulation of tribal employment activ-
ity is an exercise of sovereignty in MacArthur v. San Juan County.24 It
found that an employment relationship between a nonmember and a tribal
member within the boundaries of a reservation falls within the "consensual
relationship" exception in Montana.2" By extension, an employment rela-
tionship between a nonmember and the tribe itself would certainly fall with-
in the consensual relationship exception.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT AS PRIVATE
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY UNDER TUSCARORA-COEUR D 'ALENE
As shown below, however, most courts have refused to view tribal
employment in this way and have treated Indian nations' economic devel-
opment activities like private sector business activities. Behind decisions
holding that Indian nations are covered by federal labor and employment
laws lies an obscure Supreme Court case from 1960. In Federal Power
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,26 the Court made the unprece-
20. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1067 (Member Schaumber, dissenting) (quoting
Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (citations omitted).
21. 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
22. Id. at 1200.
23. Id. at 1192-93.
24. 497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).
25. Id. at 1072.
26. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). Tuscarora had nothing to do with employment; it involved
whether land held in fee simple by the Tuscarora Nation could be condemned under the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-823(b) (2000).
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dented statement that "a general statute in terms applying to all persons in-
cludes Indians and their property interests."27 Therefore, when employees
or federal agencies began to file lawsuits or charges against Indian nations
alleging violations of general federal labor and employment statutes, they
cited this so-called "Tuscarora rule." However, because these statutes said
nothing about Indians at all, Indian nations responded that under longstand-
ing federal Indian law canons of statutory construction,28 these general stat-
utes did not apply to them because of their sovereign status.
In an attempt to reconcile this conflict, the Ninth Circuit developed
three exceptions to the "Tuscarora rule" in Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tri-
bal Farm,29 in which that court held that the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA)" applied to a tribal agricultural business.3 The Tuscarora rule
will not apply if:
(1) [T]he law touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural ma-
ters"; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate rights guaranteed
by Indian treaties"; or (3) there is proof "by legislative history or some other means
that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.,
32
The Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis has been widely followed in
cases involving a variety of federal labor and employment laws in addition
to OSHA, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 33
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).34 Generally,
courts considered the first and third exceptions, which almost always re-
sulted in the application of the law to the tribal employment activity in ques-
tion when the activity involved transactions in interstate commerce and
when non-Indians were involved.35  This is because Coeur d'Alene very
27. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116. Many commentators have criticized Tuscarora,
most recently Professor Wildenthal, who calls it "one of the most reviled decisions in mod-
em Indian law." Wildenthal, supra note 1, at 422. See also San Manuel Indian Bingo &
Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1071 n.62 (2004), for a summary of criticisms.
28. See Wildenthal, supra note 1, at 431-45 for a discussion of the canons. Briefly,
they are as follows: "(1) ambiguities in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of Indians
and (2) a clear expression of Congressional intent is necessary before a court may construe a
federal statute so as to impair tribal sovereignty." Id. at 17 (quoting San Manuel Indian
Bingo & Casino v. NLRB., 475 F.3d 1306, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
29. 751 F.2d lll3 (9th Cir. 1985).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
31. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1114; accord Reich v. Mashantucket Pequot Sand &
Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that OSHA applies to tribal construction com-
pany performing work on casino that employs nonmembers); U.S. Dep't Labor v. O.S.H.A.,
935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating OSHA applies to lumber mill on reservation that sold
lumber in interstate commerce, and half of employees were nonmembers).
32. Coeurd'4lene, 751 F.2d at 1116.
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
34. Id. §§ 1001-1461.
35. See, e.g., Cano v. Cocopah Casino, No. CV-06-2120-PHX-JAT, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54377, at *9-10 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2007) (ADEA applies to tribally-owned casino that
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narrowly defined the first exception by confining "intramural matters" to
"conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic rela-
tions."36 The third exception turned the canons on their head by starting
from the assumption that Congress intended the statute to apply and requir-
ing the Indian nation to prove otherwise, rather than assuming that the stat-
ute does not apply and requiring proof that Congress intended it to apply.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT DEPENDENT ON
WHETHER "COMMERCIAL" OR "GOVERNMENTAL/TRADITIONALLY TRIBAL"
UNDER SAN MANUEL DECISIONS
In San Manuel, the Board determined that Indian nations are "employ-
ers" within the meaning of the NLRA and are therefore subject to its author-
ity." It applied the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis and determined that
application of the NLRA to the San Manuel's casino employment activities
did not fall within any of the exceptions. It then determined that tribal em-
ployment is of two basic types and that it would exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction depending upon which type of employment was at issue, a de-
termination it would make on a case-by-case basis. 8 The Board acknowl-
edged that a case-by-case determination would lack predictability but was
satisfied that "the process of litigation will mark the contours in due time."39
On the one hand, the Board explained that it would assert jurisdiction
over "commercial businesses":
As tribal businesses prosper, they become significant employers of non-Indians
and serious competitors with non-Indian owned businesses. When Indian tribes
participate in the national economy in commercial enterprises, when they employ
substantial numbers of non-Indians, and when their businesses cater to non-Indian
clients and customers, the tribes affect interstate commerce in a significant way.
When the Indian tribes act in this manner, the special attributes of their sovereignty
are not implicated. Running a commercial business is not an expression of sover-
eignty in the same way that running a tribal court system is.
a4
On the other hand, it would decline to assert jurisdiction when the em-
ployment activity is "traditionally tribal" or "governmental":
employs both members and nonmembers); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935
(7th Cir. 1989); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939
F.2d 683, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1991) (ERISA applies in both because no interference with self-
govermnent).
36. Coeurd'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116.
37. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1059 (2004). See infra
notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
38. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1063.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1062.
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At times, the tribes continue to act in a manner consistent with that mantle of uni-
queness. They do so primarily when they are fulfilling traditionally tribal or gov-
ernmental functions that are unique to their status as Indian tribes. These functions
are often performed on the tribes' reservations. Such traditionally tribal or gov-
ernmental functions, so located, are less likely than commercial enterprises to in-
volve non-Indians and to substantially affect interstate commerce .... Thus, when
the Indian tribes are acting with regard to this particularized sphere of traditional
tribal or governmental functions, the Board should take cognizance of its lessened
interest in regulation and the tribe's increased interest in its autonomy. In such cir-
cumstances, the Board should afford the tribes more leeway in determining how
41they conduct their affairs....
The Board illustrated the difference between the two types of tribal
employment in a supplemental decision, Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp.,
which involved organizing efforts at a non-profit hospital funded by the
U.S. Government and run by a board elected by members of fifty-eight
Alaskan tribes.4' The Board determined that although the hospital was not
exempt from the NLRA, it would not exercise jurisdiction because the hos-
pital was performing a "unique governmental function" by carrying out the
federal government's obligation to provide free health care to Indians.43
The Board weighed the following factors: ninety-five percent of patients
were Native Alaskans; although the hospital operated in interstate com-
merce, it was not competing with other hospitals; it was not located on In-
dian land, but there are no reservations in Alaska; and although the majority
of hospital employees were non-Native, "the makeup of the workforce is
likely to change" because a purpose of the federal statutes under which the
hospital operated was to increase Native employment.'
In affirming the Board's decision in San Manuel, the D.C. Circuit fo-
cused its discussion on the application of the NLRA to the casino operation
and further parsed "governmental function. '45 The court acknowledged that
"it can be argued that any activity of a tribal government is by definition
'governmental,' and even more so an activity aimed at raising revenue that
will fund governmental functions."46 But it took a very narrow view of
"governmental" as referring to "traditional acts governments perform," as
41. Id. at 1063.
42. Id. at 1075.
43. Id. at 1076-77.
44. Id. at 1076-77. The Board's treatment of the non-Native employee factor is
curious because a purpose of other federal statutes promoting Indian economic development
activities such as ISDEA is to increase Native employment. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b)(2)
(2000).
45. Although the D.C. Circuit took pains to distinguish its analysis from that of
Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene, its analysis actually mirrored the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analy-
sis by limiting the applicability of the canons to statutes involving Indians and by limiting the
scope of tribal sovereign acts. See Wildenthal, supra note 1, at 485-86, 489.
46. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
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opposed to "collateral activities that, though perhaps in some way related to
[traditional government acts], lie outside their scope. 47
IV. UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY DUAL EMPLOYER STATUS
It is not clear how the distinction will be drawn between tribal activi-
ties that are "commercial" and those that are "governmental" or "tradition-
ally tribal." Factors taken into account are whether the activity takes place
in interstate commerce, whether non-Indians are involved as employees or
customers, and, to a lesser extent, whether the activity takes place on tribal
land.48 But the extent to which the first two of these factors influence the
determination is not apparent; the lines are not distinct, and various tribal
employment activities therefore lie on a spectrum. According to the San
Manuel decisions, high-income casinos that attract millions of patrons per
year and employ hundreds of employees are at the "commercial" end of the
spectrum, whereas employment in a tribal court is on the other. According
to Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp., employment by a tribally run hospital
might be "governmental," unless, perhaps, it competes with other hospitals
in the area or the percentage of Native employees does not increase with
time. One would presume that operating tribal schools is a governmental
activity, but, as a result of the San Manuel decisions, tribal schools are be-
ing targeted by unions, which reportedly could lead to their closure.49 The
San Manuel decisions provide no real certainty to Indian nations that any
particular employment activity is immune from federal regulation.
While employment by the various political branches or agencies of
tribal government appears to be the limit of "governmental activity" de-
scribed in both decisions, it is not clear at all what "traditionally tribal" ac-
tivities entail. The Board's statement that traditional activities are unique to
a tribe's status as a tribe implies that only "Indian" activities are traditional
activities. That raises the question of what is "Indian," which will be de-
cided by non-Indian decision-makers. These decision-makers will likely be
47. Id. As Professor Wildenthal demonstrates, not only is the Tuscarora-Coeur
d'Alene analysis wrong under principles of federal Indian law, but the distinction between
"commercial" and "traditional" or "governmental" activity in both San Manuel decisions, as
well as in other cases utilizing the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis, is wrong under federal
labor law and federal constitutional law. See Wildenthal, supra note 1, at 461-77 (demon-
strating the fallacy of the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis); Id at 524-26 (comparing tribal
gaming operations to state lottery operation as a source of revenue); Id. at 517-26 (describing
the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the futility of defining "traditional governmental
functions" of state governments).
48. See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.3d at 1314-15.
49. See Rob Capriccoso, A Union Divides; National Education Association Tests
Tribal Sovereignty for a Tribe Deeply Concerned About Casino Unions, 23 AM. INDIAN REP.
4 (2007).
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guided by stereotypical notions of what constitutes "traditional" Indian ac-
tivities." As explained by one scholar:
50. Perhaps the following scenarios might help demonstrate the amorphous limits of
the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis and the insinuation of stereotyped views of "tradition-
ally tribal" activities:
Suppose the San Manuel Band owns and operates on its land an exclusive gal-
lery that sells Indian-made artwork, jewelry, blankets, and crafts. Some of these items are
made by Band members, but most are made by nonmember Indians. It has a small staff,
most of whom are Band members. Its patrons are virtually all non-Indians, however, and
most of the purchases are made by credit card and shipped out of state. Revenue from the
gallery goes to the Band's overall operating budget. Is the gallery a commercial or a tradi-
tional or a governmental activity?
Next, suppose the San Manuel Band owns and operates on its land a museum
similar to the National Museum of the American Indian in Washington, D.C. Its staff is
much larger than that of the gallery. Because it is a large population area, and the nearby
Indian population is relatively small, the vast majority of museum patrons and staff are not
Indians. The museum operates a caf6 and gift shop that sell goods obtained through inter-
state commerce. Although some of the artwork and crafts sold are made by Band members,
most are made by nonmember Indians. Other merchandise is sold that is imported from
foreign countries such as China. The museum charges $10 admission, and its revenues go
toward the Band's overall operating budget. Is the Indian museum a commercial or a tradi-
tional or a governmental activity?
Now suppose that the Band erects in the same location as the casino a theme
park on the scale of Disneyland. It is advertised as a part of the casino, as a "family-
friendly" complex in its entirety. The park complex includes a hotel, whose guests frequent
both the park and the casino. The park offers food, entertainment, and attractions such as
rides, shows, and exhibits. The theme pervading all of these features, however, relates to
American Indians. The purpose of the park, like that of the museum, is to educate about all
aspects of American Indian history; culture; and past, present, and future life. Although most
of the actors and performers are Indian, the vast majority of its management, service and
maintenance staff, and patrons, are not Indian. It charges $30 admission and attracts a num-
ber of tourists from around the world. The park is not as lucrative as the casino, but its an-
nual revenues are in the seven-figure range. Like the gallery and museum revenue, and like
the casino revenue, all revenue from the park goes toward the Band's overall budget. Is the
Indian theme park a commercial or a traditional or a governmental activity?
If the San Manuel Band had to predict in each case, it might predict that the
gallery and museum would be deemed "traditionally tribal" or "governmental" activities.
Indians traditionally have sold their handcrafted goods to nonmembers. Many Indian nations
operate cultural museums. Federal, state, and local governments operate them as well, so the
museum could be viewed as a "governmental" activity, or perhaps a "traditionally tribal"
activity because it focuses on Indian culture. But what about the facts that the majority of
patrons of both establishments are non-Indian and most of the employees of the museum are
non-Indian? What about the fact that the gallery is a purely commercial operation? Is the
fact that both focus on "Indianness" the key? What if the gallery sold artwork by non-
Indians as well? What if the museum were a natural history museum that included exhibits
on early Native people but otherwise did not focus on people at all?
As for the theme park, the Band might be uncertain about what kind of operation
it is and thus whether the NLRA or other federal laws would govern its relationship with the
theme park employees. What if the theme park were not advertised as part of the casino? Is
the theme park more like the gallery, the museum or the casino?
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[I]n common cultural texts like law, Whites and Indians are constructed differently:
whites are moving into the future, while Indians remain in the past; whites are as-
signed the quality of vision, Indians are blinded by tradition; whites are described
as deserving... Indians are not deserving primarily because, the implication is,
they do not hold to rules about efficient and privatized use of land.51
This attitude is clearly illustrated by the D.C. Circuit's stereotypically
backward characterization of sovereignty underlying its decision in San
Manuel, which trivializes Indian nations' status as governments: "The prin-
ciple of tribal sovereignty in American law exists as a matter of respect for
Indian communities. It recognizes the independence of these communities
as regards internal affairs, thereby giving them latitude to maintain tradi-
tional customs and practices."52
Fundamentally, the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis rests on such
stereotypical views of Indian nations. Its narrow definition of "intramural
matters," limited to tribal membership, inheritance, and domestic relations,
contemplates tribal authority over a narrow scope of issues that involve pre-
dominantly Indians only. Implicit in this view is that issues involving non-
Indians should not be subject to Indian authority. Professor Bethany Berger
traces the line of U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers and explains that:
[T]he decisions are rooted in the sense that tribal courts will not be fair to non-
members, and that jurisdiction over nonmembers, except where such jurisdiction is
necessary to protect practices perceived as traditionally Indian, has little to do with
the legitimacy of legal systems or tribal self-government.,3
This view is intimated by a tribal employment case in which the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the ADEA did not apply to an employment relationship be-
tween a tribal member and a tribal employer doing business on the tribe's
reservation.54 The court stated, "[t]he consideration of a tribe member's age
by a tribal employer should be allowed to be restricted (or not restricted) by
the tribe in accordance with its culture and traditions." 5  However, it also
stressed that this holding applied only to the "narrow facts of this case
which involve a member of the tribe, the tribe as an employer, and on the
reservation employment."" Presumably, the same court would hold that the
ADEA would apply to a nonmember employee even though it would not
apply to the member employee working beside her.
51. Cramer, supra note 6, at 333 (quoting Jo Carillo, Getting to Survivance: An
Essay About the Role of Mythologies in Law, 25 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 37, 40
(2002).
52. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.3d at 1314.
53. Berger, supra note 4, at 1054.
54. E.E.O.C. v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 251 (8th
Cir. 1993).
55. Id. at 249.
56. Id. at251.
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Mistrust of tribal authority was reported in the context of recent orga-
nizing efforts at a tribal casino. Explaining why his union would not peti-
tion for a vote under tribal labor laws, the local United Auto Workers direc-
tor explained:
"[B]ecause that's like saying I'm putting the fox in the hen house. The employees
would not get the true representation and protection. The judges are all employees
of Foxwoods. They're paid by the tribe. You have somewhat of a commitment to
respect and protect your employer, not to say the judges aren't qualified or don't
have the expertise, but there comes a point where it becomes a problem."
57
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIBAL REGULATORY AND ADJUDICATORY
AUTHORITY
In addition to the uncertainty created for tribal employers with respect
to which employment activities will be covered by federal laws, the general
issue of application of federal labor and employment laws to tribal employ-
ment activities also impinges on the ability of Indian nations to enact and
enforce tribal laws, certainly attributes of sovereignty.58 It also exposes the
fundamental contradiction between the Tenth Circuit's pro-sovereignty rul-
ings on the one hand and the other circuits' narrow rulings on the other.
This is illustrated by application of the NLRA.
A. Laws Governing Labor-Management Relations
The NLRA's definition of "employer" excludes governmental em-
ployers, 9 who may regulate their own employment relations. Under §
14(b)' of the NLRA, "States and Territories" may enact "right-to-work"
laws prohibiting union security clauses that are otherwise allowed under §
8(a)(3) of the NLRA.6 Union security clauses may be negotiated into col-
lective bargaining agreements to require that employees become members
of the union within thirty days of hire.6" The San Juan Pueblo enacted a
57. Gale Courey Toensing, Mashantuckets to Challenge NLRB Union Win, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Dec. 5, 2007, at A1, A3.
58. See generally CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 201-20 (Nell Jes-
sup Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
59. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000). The term "'employer' includes any person acting as
an agent of an employer.., but shall not include The United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof .... Id.
60. Id. § 164(b) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law.").
61. Id. § 158(a)(3).
62. Id.
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right-to-work law that was challenged by the NLRB as being preempted by
§ 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Applying the canons of construction applicable to
Indians and Indian nations, the court reasoned that "silence does not work a
divestiture of tribal power. "63 It noted that § 8(a)(3) was not intended by
Congress to preempt state right-to-work laws; in other words, Congress did
not take away the power of states and territories to legislate and enforce
such laws.' Congress's enactment of § 14(b) "recognized and affirmed
their existing authority.
65
The court construed § 14(b)'s "States and Territories" language to
contemplate a "diversity of legal regimes respecting union security agree-
ments at the level of 'major policy-making units,"' and held that the Pueb-
lo acted as a sovereign akin to a state or territory when it enacted laws such
as the right-to-work law to govern its economic activities:
Like states and territories, the Pueblo has a strong interest as a sovereign in regu-
lating economic activity involving its own members within its own territory, and it
therefore may enact laws governing such activity .... The legislative enactment of
the Pueblo 's right-to-work ordinance was also clearly an exercise of sovereign au-
thority over economic transactions on the reservation.
67
Therefore, just as Congress did not take away the power of states and terri-
tories to legislate right to work laws, it did not take away the power of In-
dian nations to legislate such laws.68
The Tenth Circuit specifically stated, however, that San Juan did not
involve whether the Pueblo was a covered employer under the NLRA.69 But
that was precisely the issue before the Board in San Manuel. The NLRB
held Indian nations to be covered employers under the NLRA, regardless of
the employment activity in question. It found that Indian nations did not
fall within the NLRA's exemption 70 of the United States, wholly owned
Government corporations, Federal Reserve Banks, States, or political subdi-
visions of states.7' It then found nothing in the NLRA's legislative history
or in other legislation indicating that Congress intended the NLRA to apply
63. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002).
64. Id. at 1198.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1197.
67. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1198.
69. Id. at 1191.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000).
71. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1058 (2004).
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to Indian nations.72 The D.C. Circuit deferred to the Board's determination
as a permissible construction of the statute under the Chevron analysis.73
If Indian nations are covered by the NLRA, as San Manuel holds, they
cannot at the same time be exempt from it, as San Juan implies. Although
San Juan did not reach the question of whether Indian nations were covered
by the NLRA (conversely, whether they were exempt from its coverage), it
found them to be sovereign "policy-making units" analogous to states and
territories under § 14(b).74 If Indian nations are analogous to governmental
entities covered by § 14(b) that possess power to regulate private-sector
labor-management relations through right-to-work laws, as San Juan holds,
it follows that they would be analogous to governmental entities excluded
from coverage of the NLRA by § 152(2), which possess power to regulate
fully their own labor relations. But if Indian nations are "employers" sub-
ject to the NLRA under § 152(2), as San Manuel holds, they cannot at the
same time enact right-to-work laws regulating labor relations; § 14(b)
would not apply to them at all.
Even if Indian nations were considered governmental entities exempt
from coverage by the NLRA, any tribal legislation governing private sector
(i.e., non-tribal) labor-management relations within tribal land might never-
theless be held to be preempted by the NLRA, except for a "right-to-work"
law. Congress intended the NLRA to create a uniform set of rules, reme-
dies, and procedures to govern labor-management relations.75 States may
not regulate areas involving private-sector labor-management relations that
are regulated by the NLRA,76 with the exception of "right-to-work" laws
permitted under § 14(b) as discussed above.
Again, the pro-sovereignty position of the Tenth Circuit is potentially
at odds with that of other circuits. As discussed previously, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held in San Juan that § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA did not preempt a tribal
right-to-work law.77 While the court stressed that Congressional silence
does not divest a tribe of inherent powers,7" the court confined its preemp-
tion analysis to the question of whether § 8(a)(3) preempted the Pueblo's
right-to-work law. The court found that Congress never intended § 8(a)(3)
to be preemptive in the first place.79 It did not address the larger issue of
72. Id. The Board misapplied the federal Indian law canon of construction requiring
a clear expression of congressional intent to apply a statute to Indian nations, rather than an
expression of intent not to do so. See supra note 28.
73. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1316 (2007)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
74. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1200.
75. San Diego Bldg. Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959).
76. Id. at 244.
77. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1197.
78. Id. at 1196.
79. Id. at 1197.
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whether the NLRA would preempt other tribal laws governing the labor-
management relationship.
The law is not clear with regard to preemption of tribal laws by federal
laws. One case decided that federal law did preempt a tribal ordinance, but
the underlying federal statute expressly addressed preemption of tribal
law.8" The Eighth Circuit discussed preemption in a case in which it held
that OSHA applied to a tribal construction company.8 It reasoned that be-
cause Indian nations are not states under OSHA, "OSHA does not preempt
tribal safety regulations in the same manner in which it preempts state laws.
• . [so tribes are] free to adopt additional regulations ...consistent with
OSHA . ". .."" Following this reasoning, one could conclude that a court
addressing preemption by the NLRA would hold at the least that tribal leg-
islation governing labor-management relations could not conflict with the
NLRA, so therefore tribal laws that prohibit strikes or other rights granted
by the NLRA would be preempted.
B. Tribal Employment Rights Ordinances
In addition, application of the NLRA to Indian nations might usurp
their ability to legislate and enforce tribal employment rights ordinances.
Such ordinances are authorized under various federal laws and are utilized
to provide employment opportunity and training." Preferential hiring is
typically a subject of collective bargaining."
A key to tribal economic development is a qualified workforce and
full employment among its citizens. Indians comprise the poorest group in
the United States, 5 and Congress has expressed strong policy throughout
Indian legislation to promote training and employment among Indians.86
Tribal employment rights ordinances should not be subject to outside inter-
ference.
C. Tribal Penalties and Remedies
NLRB Member Schaumber suggested that application of the NLRA to
tribal employment might interfere with an Indian nation's adjudicatory and
80. N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 991
F.2d 458, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1993).
81. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996).
82. Id. at 181.
83. See generally COHEN, supra note 58, at 1301-03.
84. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1067 (2004) (Member
Schaumber, dissenting).
85. See Indianz.com, Native Americans Still Poorest in United States, Aug. 30,
2006, http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/015687.asp.
86. See COHEN, supra note 58, at 1332-34.
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enforcement authority. Suppose a tribal adjudicatory body determined that
a tribal member should be banished for reasons unrelated to his employ-
ment, and, as a result, the member loses his employment. The mem-
ber/employee could grieve his firing, and an arbitrator could award rein-
statement. Or the employee's union could file an unfair labor practice
charge on his behalf due to the firing. The NLRB could determine the firing
to be an unfair labor practice and order reinstatement of the employee. It is
not clear which interest would be paramount, that of the NLRA or that of
the tribal justice system. 7
Another conflict between tribal sovereignty and the application of fed-
eral labor and employment laws to Indian nations arises in the context of
sovereign immunity.8 As individuals sue for relief under the labor and em-
ployment statutes, Indian nations will respond that neither they nor Con-
gress has waived their immunity from suits by individuals for money dam-
ages. The distinction between application of a federal statute and immunity
from individuals' suits for damages is illustrated by Florida Paraplegic
Ass 'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida.9 Applying the Tuscarora-
Coeur d'Alene analysis, the court determined that Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act," which requires that public accommodations be ac-
cessible to the disabled, applied to the Miccosukee Tribe's casino.9' How-
ever, because there was no "definitive language" in Title III indicating in-
tent to waive the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suits for money dam-
ages, it could only be subject to suit by the United States Attorney General
to compel compliance.'
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that waivers of tribal so-
vereign immunity must be "express and unequivocal," 3 and, importantly, it
has refused to distinguish between employment in tribal commercial activi-
ties and tribal governmental activities when applying the doctrine.94 In the
latest case, however, the Court criticized the doctrine in light of "modem,
wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well beyond traditional tribal cus-
toms."'95 Although the Court deferred to Congress to change the doctrine, its
87. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1068 n.32 (Member Schaumber, dissenting).
88. Id. at 1068.
89. 166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000).
91. Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, 166 F.3d at 1129.
92. Id. at 1134-35. See also Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
that the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000), did not waive tribal
immunity from suit).
93. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Okla. Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991).
94. Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 510; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523
U.S. 751, 760 (1998).
95. Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 523 U.S. at 757-58.
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words, "enterprises extending well beyond traditional tribal customs," re-
flect stereotyping and provide little comfort in the present context.
As held in Florida Paraplegic Ass 'n, silence in the federal labor and
employment statutes should not be sufficient to effect such a waiver of tri-
bal sovereign immunity, despite a finding that the statutes apply to Indian
nations. Board Member Schaumber, however, surmised that application of
federal labor and employment statutes might work a "forced waiver of sov-
ereign immunity" on Indian nations.96
If Member Schaumber is correct, federal procedures and remedies will
supplant procedures and remedies developed by Indian nations that are most
appropriate to the nations' particular economic, cultural, and social circum-
stances. The "one-size-fits all" assimilationist approach to regulation of
tribal employment activity is simply not appropriate when "sizes" are not
the same.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL ADOPTION OF THE TUSCAROR4ICOEUR D 'ALENE
ANALYSIS
Finally, it is doubtful that Congress will act favorably to remedy prob-
lems created by Indian nations' dual "commercial" and "governmen-
tal/traditionally tribal" employer status under federal labor and employment
laws, as the Tuscarora/Coeur d'Alene analysis has already found its way
into legislation. In the Pension Protection Act,97 effective January 1, 2007,
Congress amended the "government plan" exclusion in ERISA and the In-
ternal Revenue Code to include Indian tribes, but only with respect to plans
covering employees performing "essential government functions" and not
those performing "commercial activities":
a plan which is established and maintained by an Indian tribal goverment... a
subdivision of an Indian tribal government ... or an agency or instrumentality of
either... and all of the participants of which are employees of such entity substan-
tially all of whose services as such an employee are in the performance of essential
governmental functions but not in the performance of commercial activities
(whether or not an essential government function). 98
The statute defines neither "essential government functions" nor
"commercial activities."
96. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1068 (2004) (Member
Schaumber, dissenting).
97. Pension Protection Act of 2006, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (2006).
98. Id.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
It may be very difficult to convince Congress that the Tuscarora-
Coeur d' Alene analysis is incorrect and infringes upon tribal sovereignty in
light of its action in the Pension Protection Act. If the labor and employ-
ment statutes will be applied to tribal employers, these employers must take
additional steps to assure fair treatment of their employees in order to make
unions or lawsuits seem less desirable. Among other scholars advocating
that Indian nations should take affirmative steps to assure fairness in the
workplace,9 Professor Wenona Singel suggests that employees be apprised
of the costs and benefits of their choices and that Indian nations offer less
costly alternatives for protection of employee rights in the form of tribal
procedures and remedies that assure fair treatment. Employees should be
given a choice of means of improving the terms and conditions of employ-
ment in lieu of union membership or suits under federal statutes, and tribes
should make it desirable and more cost-efficient to choose tribal remedies.'0°
CONCLUSION
Bifurcation of tribal employment and differentiation between rules
that apply to each leave Indian nations in a state of confusion, not knowing
which of their activities will trigger federal regulation and oversight, and
not knowing precisely what factors will be used to make this determination.
Moreover, the determination of whether activities trigger regulation will
always be made by federal courts or agencies. Sorting this out through liti-
gation, as the Board suggests, would be a prolonged nightmare for Indian
nations, not to mention a drain on their treasuries. But the fact of the matter
is that neither "governmental" nor "traditionally tribal" activity will gener-
ate revenue sufficient to fund an Indian nation; commercial activity is nec-
essary to bring sufficient revenue into the nation to fund its political, social,
cultural, and economic infrastructures.'
"Commercial activity" is thus truly "governmental" activity; the only
alternative funding source for Indian nations is the U.S. Government. Re-
treat to federal control of tribal governments and services is antithetical to
the interests of Indian nations and people, Congressional policy expressed in
99. See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law
Enigma, Tribal Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 273 (2005).
100. Wenona T. Singel, Remarks at Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting (Jan. 5, 2008) (author's notes).
101. See San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1074 (Member Schaumber, dissenting).
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laws such as ISDEA l1 2 and IGRA,' °3 and the interests of the United States
itself. Federal regulation of tribal employment relations under the mis-
guided principles of the Tuscarora/Coeur d'Alene and San Manuel deci-
sions, however, signals a return to U.S.-Indian relations tainted by paternal-
ism and assimilationism. Indian nations must be able to define, create and
sustain productive, mutually beneficial employment relationships through
development of sound policies consistent with those nations' particular and
varied needs.
102. "[T]he prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served to
retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities... and has
denied to the Indian people an effective voice in the planning and implementation of pro-
grams . . . which are responsive to the true needs of Indian communities." 25 U.S.C. §
450(a)(1) (2000).
103. "[A] principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic devel-
opment, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4)
(2000).
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